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I. Introduction
Risk averse workers
prefer

to

insure

against

unemployment.

If

unemployment

insurance

jobless spells.

facing uncertain employment prospects

they

adverse
could,

economic
they

in order to

conditions

would

finance

purchase

such

as

private

consumption during

In fact, if the insurance were actuarially fair,

it is well known that the all risk averse workers would choose to
fully insure so that consumption during unemployment would exactly
equal consumption while employed.
insurance

markets

are

But, for a variety of reasons,

incomplete,

and

private

unemployment

insurance cannot be purchased.
In the absence of private insurance markets, agents will try
and save during periods of employment and dissave during jobless
spells.

It is unlikely, however, that workers would be able to

save enough to completely smooth consumption across periods of
employment

and

In

unemplo~ent.

response

to

this

problem,

virtually every developed country provides public unemployment
insurance

(UI).

In the united states,

there

is considerable

empirical evidence that Ul does what it was intended to do -- it
allows workers to smooth consumption.

For example, in a recent

paper, Gruber (1994) estimates that without UI consumption would
fall by 22% during unemployment, whereas it falls by only 7% with
UI in place.
But UI has unintended effects' as well.

By now' there is

considerable evidence that Ul increases the length of unemployment

1
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spells .1

By providing unemployment

insurance,

reduces the opportunity cost of unemployment.

the government

This reduces search

effort and increases both the length of unemployment spells and the
equilibrium rate of unemployment. 2

In designing an optimal U1

program, the positive and negative effects of U1 must be weighed
against one another.
There are two classic theoretical treatments of optimal U1 -Baily (1978) and Flemming (1978).

Both take the same approach,

considering the situation faced by a typical unemployed worker and
solving for optimal search effort as a function of UI.

Although

the actual spell of unemployment is a random variable, its expected
value varies inversely with search effort.

Both authors solve the

optimal insurance problem by choosing UI to maximize the expected
lifetime utility of the representative worker.

The papers differ

in their treatments of leisure, savings, and the capital market.
Nevertheless, both papers and the empirical work making use of
their approach all seem to conclude that UI ,payments in the united
states are too generous (see, for example, Gruber 1994 and O'Leary
1994).
The purpose of this paper is to extend the analysis offered by
Baily and Flemmin9 in two ways.

First,

in formulating their

models, both authors assume that UI is offered indefinitely -- that
See Davidson and Woodbury (1995b) for a review and new
evidence based on the reemployment bonus experiments.
2
It is often argued, on the other hand, that UI makes workers
choosier about the jobs they accept, and that this may improve the
quality of job matches.
This notion has persisted despite very
little empirical evidence in support of it.

2
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is, unemployed workers collectUI benefits in every period until
they find a job.
indefinitely.

But few UI systems are set up to pay benefits

In the United states, workers usually exhaust their

UI benefits after 26 weeks of unemployment.

The potential duration

of benefits is longer in Canada -- where it is about 1 year -- and
in most of western Europe -- where it is 3 years or longer in
several countries,
the

countries

and~indefinite in

whereUI

is

Belgium (OECD 1991).

offered

for

3 years

or

Even in

longer,

a

significant number of ·workers . remain unemployed long enough to
exhaust their benefits.
account

the

finite

In section III, we show that taking into

potential

dur,-ation

of

benefits drastically

alters the conclusions reached by Baily and Flemming.

For example,

Flemming finds that if lending and borrowing are ruled out, the
optimal

replacement

rate

is

replacement rate is close to
actually

around

indefinitely.

approximately
.75

two-thirds),

.75.

The

in our model as well

assuming

that

UI

is

optimal
(it is
offered

However, if UI is offered for only 26 weeks,

the

optimal replacement rate rises to 1.
Also in section III,

we solve for the optimal UI program

assuming that it can' be characterized by two instruments --the
level of UI benefits (or the replacement rate) and the potential
duration of benefits.

Surprisingly, we find that the optimal UI

program is characterized by an
benefits.

infinite potential duration of

The argument is as follows.

Let x denote the level of

benefits and let T denote the potential duration of Ul.

Suppose

that we compare twoUI programs (x ll T1 ) and (x2 ,T2 ) with

> x 2 and

3
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Xl

T1 < T2 so that the second program offers
longer potential duration'of benefits.
two

programs

employed

cost

workers

programs.

taxpayers
earn

the

the
same

lower benefits but a

Suppose further that these

same

amount

after-tax

to

wage

fund
under

so

that

the

two

We find that all risk-averse unemployed workers prefer

the second program in spite of the fact that benefits are lower.
They

prefer

the

second

program

because

the

reduction

in

the

probability that they will exhaust their benefits more than offsets
the reduction in their benefits.

In the terminology of decision

making under uncertainty, the second program is "less risky" than
the first program and is therefore preferred by all risk averse
agents.

Since the optimal ur program offers workers benefits

indefinitely while most state programs in the united states offer
benefits for only 26 weeks, the model's results suggest that the
current united States system may not be generous enough.
The second extension we offer concerns the composition of the
pool of unemployed workers.

Both Baily and Flemming assume that

all unemployed workers are eligible for UI benefits.

In reality,

fewer than half of all unemployed workers in the united states are
UI-eligible (Blank and Card 1991).

We show that this fact has

important implications for the optimal replacement rate.
there are two effects.

Briefly,

First, since an increase in UI benefits

reduces the search intensity ofUI-eligible workers, UI-ineligibles
gain as they face less competition for jobs.

This positive spill-

over effect of ur increases the optimal replacement rate.
second

effect

is

more

subtle

and
4

BB-7

depends

on

the

degree

The
of

SUbstitutability in production between Ur-eligible and ineligible
workers.

Since Ur-ineligibles receive no ur benefits, they search

harder than UI-eligible workers.

If these two types of workers are

close substitutes, then treating all workers as if they are UIeligibles will overstate the reemployment prospects for Ur-eligible
workers.

In this case,

the presence of UI-ineligibles in the

workforce increases the optimal replacement rate; that is, since
Ur-ineligibles
reemployment,

make
the

it

harder

government

for

needs

tend

substitutes for

to

be

to

increase

level

to

insurance it provides to UI-eligibles.
ineligibles

UI-eligibles

of

On the other hand, if ur-

lower-skilled

ur-eligibl~

the

find

workers

who

are

poor

workers, then treating all workers as

if the were UI-eligible will understate the reemployment prospects
of

Ur-eligible

workers.

In

this

case,

the

presence

of

UI-

ineligibles in the workforce lowers the optimal replacement rate
(i.e., less insurance is needed).

When we combine the spill-over

effect and the effect of sUbstitutability between Ur-eligibles and
Ur-ineligibles, we find that unless the degree of sUbstitutability
between Ur-eligibles

and UI-ineligibles

is

extremely

low,

the

presence of UI-ineligibles raises the optimal replacement rate.
In summary, . we emphasize the

importance of extending the

models of Baily and Flemming to incorporate two empirical features
of the U1 system
length of time
benefits.

When

that UI benefits are offered only for a finite
and that not all workers
their

models

are

are eligible for

extended

features, the optimal replacement rate rises.
5
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to

include

UI

these

In fact, we find

that for

reasonable parameter values,

our model

suggests

that

average statutory UI benefits in the united states are too low and
that the potential duration of benefits is too short.
The paper is divided into three additional sections.

In

section II, we introduce a model that is similar in spirit to those
of Baily and Flemming in that

it assumes

workers are eligible for UI.

However,

theirs

a

in

benefits.

that

we

allow

for

finite

that all

unemployed

our model differs
potential

from

duration

of

using this model, we show in section III.A that any

program that eventually cuts off benefits is Pareto-Dominated by
another program that offers more periods of coverage.

Thus, any

optimal program must include an infinite potential duration of
benefits.

In section III.B, we solve for the optimal replacement

rate under a program in which benefits are offered indefinitely.
In section III.C we calculate optimal replacement rates for suboptimal programs -- that is, programs in which benefits are cut off
after a

certain length of time.

In section IV. A we drop the

assumption that all unemployed workers are eligible for UI,

and

show that when UI-ineligibles are added to the model the optimal
replacement

rate

is

likely

to

increase.

In

section

IV . B we

consider the effects of adding voluntary saving to the model.

We

reason that, although including savings would reduce the optimal
replacement rate somewhat, it would not alter our conclusion that
an infinite potential duration of benefits is optimal.

Finally,.in

section V we discuss the omission of worker heterogeneity from the
model and offer some conjectures as to how this omission might
6
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results.

We

also

lity of the results.

7
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summarize

and

discuss

the

II. Model and Approach
We follow Baily and Flemming by modeling the behavior of a
representative unemployed worker who is searching for employment.
This worker earns a wage of

while employed and collects UI

W

benefits of x while unemployed provided that he has not exhausted
his benef its.

Benefits are provided by the government to all

jobless workers
periods.

who

have

been unemployed

for

no

more

thanT

UI is funded by taxing all employed workers' incomes at

a constant rate T.
We assume that unemployed workers choose search effort (p) to
maximize

expected

infinitely lived. 3
determines

lifetime

income

and

that

all

Given total labor demand (F),

equilibrium

government's goal
expected

lifetime

steady-state

workers

are

search effort

unemployment

(U).4

The

is to choose x and T to maximize aggregate
income.

Increases

in

x

and/or

T

provide

unemployed workers with additional insurance but these increases
also lower optimal search effort and therefore increase equilibrium
unemployment.

The optimal

governm~nt

policy must balance these two

opposing forces.
Formally, we use L to denote total labor supply and let J
represent

the

equilibrium.

total

number

Then,. since

of

jobs

held

every worker

is

in

the

either

steady-state
employed or

3
We assume infinite life since it makes the model much more
tractable. Flemming also makes this assumption while Baily uses a
two-period model.

4 Following Baily and Flemming, we do not model the firm and
treat F and w as exogenous variables.
8
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, we 'have:

L

=

J

+ U.

later use, we define

~

to be the equilibrium number of workers

have been unemployed for t

periods

(t = 1, ... ,T)

and let Ux

the equilibrium number of unemployed workers who have
exhausted their UI benefits.

We then write total unemployment as:

Turn next to the firms.

For simplicity, we assume that each

firm provides only one job opportunity.s

Thus, F denotes both the

total number of firms and the total number of jobs available at any
time.

Each job is either filled or vacant.

If we let V denote the

number of vacancies in a steady-state equilibrium, it follows that:

(3)

F

=

J

+ V.

The remainder of the model

is explained

in three stages.

First, we describe the dynamics of the labor market and derive the
conditions that must hold in a steady-state equilibrium.

These

conditions guarantee that the unemployment rate and the composition

S
This assumption is commonly used in general equilibrium
search models (see, for example, Diamond 1982 or Pissarides 1990).
Alternatively, we could simply assume that each firm recruits for
and fills each of its many vacancies separately.

9
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of unemployment both remain constant over time.
search

intensity

probabilities.

by

unemployed

workers

to

Second, we relate
their

reemployment

We then use these reemployment probabilities to

derive the expected lifetime incomes of employed and unemployed
workers.

Finally, in stage three, we derive the optimal level of

search effort for all unemployed workers.
To describe the dynamics of the labor market, let s denote the
probability that an employment relationship will break up in any
given period -- that is, the job turnover or separation rate.

In

addition, let 11\ and lnx denote the reemployment probabilities for
workers

in

their

respectively.

ttb

period

of

search

For any given worker,

employment states -- UlI U2 ,

•••• ,

and

for

UI-exhaustees,

there are T + 2 possible

UT , Ux' and J.

If employed (i. e. ,

if in state J) the worker faces a probability sof losing her job
and moving into state U1 •

If unemployed for t periods (i.e., if in

state Ut ) , the worker faces a probability of

~

of finding a job and

with the remaining probability of 1 - ·lnt this

moving into state J.

worker remains unemployed and moves on to state

~+1.

Finally, UI

exhaustees face a reemployment probability of lnx, in which case they
move into state J.

Otherwise, they remain in state Ux.

In a steady-state equilibrium the flows into and out of each
state

must

be

equal

so

that

the

composition do not change over time.

unemployment

sJ = Ute

10
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and

its

Using the above notation, the

flows into and out of state U1 are equal if:

(4)

rate

The flows into and out of state Ut (for t = 2, ..• ,T,) are equal if:

Finally, the flows into and out of state Ux are equal if:

In each case, the flow into the state is given on the left-handside of the expression while the flow out of the state is given on
the right-hand-side.
Turn next to the reemployment probabilities.

Each unemployed

worker chooses search effort to maximize expected lifetime income.
We use Pt to denote the search effort of a worker who is in her

t~

period of search,with Px playing the same role for ur exhaustees.
Search effort is best thought of as the number of firms a worker
chooseS to contact in each period of job search.

(For workers who'

contact fewer than one firm on average, Pt could be thought of as
the probability of contacting any firm.)

Once a worker contacts a

firm, she files an application for employment if the firms has a
vacancy.

Since there are F firms and V of them have vacancies, the

probability of contacting a firm with a vacancy is .V/F.
once all applications have been filed,
fills

that

applicants.

vacancy
Thus,

by

choosing

each firm with a vacancy

randomly

if N other workers

Finally,

from

apply to

its

pool

the firm,

probability of a given worker getting the job is 1/(N+1).
11
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of
the

Since

each

othe~

worker

eith~r

does or does not apply,

N is a random

variable with aPoissondfstribution with parameter A equal to the
average

number

applicati~ns

of

straightforward to'show;that

thi~

filed

at· each

firm.

It

is

implies that the probability of

getting a job offer conditional 'onhaving applied at a firm with a
vacancy is (l/A)( i

-

e·~].

The reemployment probability for any,

given worker is then the product of these three terms -- the number
of firms contacted, the probability-that
vacancy,

a

given firm will have a

and the probability of getting the job conditional on

having applied at a firm with a vacancy:

for t

=

1, ... ,T

where

These equations 'define' the reemployment probabilities of workers as
a function of search'effort and'the length of time that they have
been unemployed
given worker,

(since ll\ varies 'over" time) .

the search effort of other workers

worker's reemployment:probability through
Finally,

Note that for any
affects that

A.

to determine optimal search effort we must first

define expected lifetime income for all workers.
12
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Let Vw denote the

) Vw

= w(l -

1)

+

[sV l

+

(1 -

s)Vwl/ (1

+

r).

Note that future income is discounted with r denoting the interest
rate.
For

unemployed

workers,

current

income

is

equal

to

unemployment insurance (if benefits have not yet been exhausted)
less search costs.

We assume that the cost of search is given by

c(p) where c is a convex function with c(O) = O.

Future income

depends on future employment status -- with probability 11\ the
worker finds a job and can expect to earn Vw in the future, while
with the remaining probability she remains unemployed and can
expect to earn vt + 1 in the future.

Thus,

fort= 1 / ••• / T.

( 12 ) V x

= -

c (px)

+ [ DlxVw +

(1 -

lllx) V x) / (1

. 13
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+ r) •

Unemployed workers choose search effort (Pt) to maximize expected
lifetime income

( 13) Pt

=

(~).

Thus,

arg max Vt

for t = 1, ... , T

( 14) Px = arg max Vx•

This completes the description of the model.
is very similar to Flemming's model.
that

ur

However,

structurally it
Flemming assumed

benefits are offered indefinitely and therefore,

model all unemployed workers are identical.

in his

One of our purposes is

to relax the assumption of indefinite benefits.

Our model allows

us to capture the notion that unemployed workers who have been
unemployed for a longer period of time will search harder as they
begin to worry about eXhausting their benefits.
show below,
offered

In addition, as we

once we take into account the fact that UI

indefinitely,

conclusions

about

optimal

U1

is not

levels are

altered drastically.
Before we turn to optimal policy,

it

is useful' to

first

describe the structure of equilibrium and some of its comparative
dynamic

properties.

It

is

straightforward

to

show

that

the

structure of equilibrium is such that Vw > VI > V2 > ••• > VT > Vx •
That is, expected lifetime income is highest for employed workers,
lowest for unemployed workers who have exhausted their benefits,
and decreasing
unemployed.

in the number of weeks that a

worker has been

Intuitively, workers in the early stages of a spell of
14
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I

unemployment have more weeks to find a
worry about losing their UI benefits.

job before they have to

Because of this, workers who

have recently become unemployed will not search as hard as those
who have been unemployed for a longer period of time -- that is,
9ptimal search effort will be increasing in the number of weeks of
unsuccessful search (Pt < P2 < ••• < PT < Px).
A decrease in UI benefits (x)

or the potential duration of

benefits (T) decreases the level of insurance offered unemployed
workers and triggers

an

increase

in search effort by all UI-

eligible workers (and therefore lowers equilibrium unemployment).
Either change results in a decrease in Vt for all t.

But decreases

in x and T have opposite effects on the probability of eXhausting
benefits.

A decrease in x makes it less likely that a worker will

exhaust her UI benefits before finding a job (since she searches
harder).

But a decrease in T makes it more likely that benefits

will be exhausted since the time horizon over which benefits are
offered has been shortened (this is true even though search effort
increases as a result of the decrease in T) .
One

final

feature

of

the

model

needs

to

be

emphasized.

Although we assume that agents act to maximize expected lifetime
income (as opposed to utility), they are in fact risk averse.
aversion follows from the
in search effort.

~ssumption

Risk

that search costs are convex

Any increase in the wage or decrease in UI

benefits triggers an increase in search effort; but since search
costs are convex,

optimal search effort is concave in wand x.

This implies that expected lifetime income is concave in wand x,
15
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making the worker risk averse with respect to income.

This is

important because it implies that any pOlicy change that reduces
the risk associated with unemployment will be welfare enhancing.

16
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III. Social Welfare and Optimal

ur

Benefits

In the context of the m'odel outlinedabPYe,Jsocial welfare can
be calculated by aggregating expected lifetime income across all
'Workers.

In

a

steady-state

equilibrium

there

are

J

employed

workers with expected lifetime incomes of Vw , Ut unemployed workers
who are in their t~ period of search with expected lifetime incomes
of

Vt ,

and

Ux unemployed

workers

who

have

exhausted

benefits with expected lifetime incomes of Vx •

their

UI

Aggregating yields

Social Welfare (SW):

The government's problem is to choose x (the UI benefit level)
and T (the potential duration of benefits) to maximize (15) with
the tax rate, T, set such that the government bUdget balances:

(16)

=

JWT

x(U - Ux).

As noted above, increases in x or T increase the level of insurance
provided

to

unemployed

workers

unemployment and require that

T

but

also

increase

increase

equilibrium

in order to fund the

expanded proqram.

A. Optimal Potential Duration of Benefits
The most

straightforward way to determine the

program is to proceed in two steps.

17
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optimal

UI

First, for any tax rate (T),

'we consider the set of all tax neutral programs (so that workers'
incomes are the same while employed under any of the programs). and
determine which one leads to the highest expected lifetime income
for unemployed workers.

Two programs are defined to be tax neutral

if they are funded by taxing income at the same rate.
that if two programs are tax neutral,

workers' net income while

employed will be' the same under either program.
program leads to a higher
superior to the other

~

Thus,

for all t and a higher Vx '

program~

if one

it must be

This' is in fact the case -- if we

consider two tax neutral programs,

the program with the longer

potential duration of benefits (higher T)

and the lower level of

benefits (lower x) will lead to larger values of
a larger value of Vx •

Thus, for any given

is characterized by T

=

00.

It follows

Setting T

=

00

optimal program for any given 1 as X(1).

1,

~

for all t and

the optimal program

allows us to write the
In the second step, we

then maximize social welfare over X(1) .
To see why it is optimal to set T
(x, T) where T is finite.

=

00,

consider any program

Now, increase the potential duration of

benefits (T) by one period and lower the weekly benefit amount (x)
in a tax neutral manner.
policy?

What are the affects of this change in

since the change is tax neutral, net income while employed

is unchanged.

For the unemployed,

indirect effects on current income.
benefits are lower

there

are

both direct' and

The direct effect is that

in the first T periods of unemployment but

benefits are now offered for an additional period.
effect works through search effort.
18
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The indirect

For reasons that will become

clear shortly,

the policy change reduces search effort

periods of unemployment, thereby lowering search costs.

in all
Once we

combine these effects, we are left with three cases to consider
there are periods t

=

l, ... ,T in which the worker is eligible to

receive UI under either program, there is period T+l in which the
worker receives UI under the new program but not the old program,
and there are periods t

=

T+2, ..•.

in which the worker does not

receive UI benefits under either program.
direct effect of lowering benefits

In periods l, ••• ,T, the

~wamps

the cost savings from

reduced search effort so that current income falls.

In period T+l,

the worker receives benefits under the new program, raising current
income.

Finally, in periods T+2 and on, there are no benefits to

lower, so everything depends on the indirect effect -- since search
costs are lower, current income is higher.
This impact of the policy change on current income is depicted
in Figure 1.

Current income for the employed is unchanged,

it

falls for unemployed workers in the first T periods of search, and
it increases for all unemployed workers who have been searching at
least T+l periods.

Thus, this policy change increases income in

the most adverse states of unemployment and lowers it in the least
adverse

states

of

unemployment

possible states of unemployment.

it

smoothes

income

across

Since the unemployed are risk

averse and since total UI benefits given to the unemployed are the
same under the two programs,

this raises the expected lifetime

19
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utility of all unemployed workers. 6
In this model with homogeneous workers,

increasing T and

lowering x in a tax neutral manner makes all unemployed workers
better off.

Accordingly, their expected lifetime incomes rise (V t

increases for all t).

This is why the pOlicy change lowers search

effort -- since expected lifetime income while unemployed rises,
the opportunity cost of unemployment falls, triggering a decrease
in search effort.
Extending the potential duration of benefits in a tax neutral
way

also

increases

workers (Vw).
the policy

the

expected

lifetime

income

for

To see why, consider (10) which defines Vw •

change

is

tax

neutral,

w (1

-

1)

does

not

However, since the unemployed are better off, Vi rises.
increases.

employed
Since
change.
Thus, Vw

It follows that the shift in pOlicy makes all agents

better off.
In summary, a tax neutral change in pOlicy that increases the
potential duration of benefits (T) and lowers the weekly benefit
amount

,(x)

smoothes

the

receipt

of

income

over

states

of

unemployment without lowering the total amount of income received
by the unemployed.

since all risk averse agents wish to smooth

consumption, this makes all agents better off.

6
In the terminOlogy of decision making under uncertainty, the
policy change results. in a "Rothschild-stiglitz decrease in risk"
for unemployed workers (see Rothschild and stiglitz, 1970).

20
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B.

Optimal Replacement Rates with Unlimited Benefit Duration
We next obtain the optimal UI

replacement rate under the

assumption that T -- the potential duration of UI

benefits --

equals infinity.

Setting T equal to infinity makes sense for two

reasons.

we found above that it is the optimal policy.

First,

Second, setting T to infinity simplifies the model greatly because
it makes all unemployed workers behave in an identical fashion over
the entire spell of unemployment.

Since no worker is getting close

to eXhausting benefits, all earn the same present and future income
and choose the same level of search effort.

If the potential

duration of benefits were limited, search intensity would vary over
the spell of unemployment, rising as the exhaustion point neared.
(In the next sUb-section, we obtain the optimal replacement rate
under limited potential duration of UI benefits.)
When

T

is

set

to

infinity,

equations

nchanged, while (2) becomasunnecessary.

(1)

and

(3)

are

In addition, since we no

longer need to keep track of the composition of unemployment, the
teady-state equations can be simplified.

Equations (5) and (6)

an be dropped while (4) needs to be modified.

While the flow into

nemployment is still sJ, the flow out of unemployment becomes (1 where m represents
nemployed worker.

the

reemployment probability

for

any

Thus, the new steady-state condition becomes sJ

mUG
The probability of reemployment (m) also becomes simpler to
efine -- it is now defined by (7) with the t sUbscripts on m and
dropped.

Equation (8) can be dropped, and the definition of A
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simplifies to A

=

pUfF.

Turn next to expected
Define

Vu

to

be

the

unemployed workers.

lifetime

expected

income and

lifetime

search effort.

income

ealned

by

all

Then, using the same logic as in section A,

(10) and (11) can be written as:

Vw

=

w(l - 1) + (sVu + (1 - s)Vw J/(l + r)

Vu

=

x - c(p) + (mVw + (1 - m)V u J/(l + r).

and,

Optimal search effort (p) is chosen to maximize Vue
Finally, for the government, Social Welfare can now be written
as SW

=

+ UVu while the government bUdget constraint can be

JVw

simplified to JW1

=

xU.

The government's goal is now to choose x

to maximize SW sUbject to its bUdget constraint.
Although this model is far simpler than the one laid out in
section A, it is still too complex to yield a closed form solution
for the optimal value of x.

Again following Baily and Flemming, we

choose parameter values and solve the model explicitly for the
optimal x.

Assuming that our parameters are chosen wisely, this

should give us some idea of the range in which the optimal level of
benefits falls.
The parameters of the model include the separation rate (s),
the interest rate
available (F)

I

(r),

the wage

(w),

the total number of jobs

the size of the labor force (L), and the search cost

function (c(p».

We can obtain an estimate of s from the existing
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on labor market dynamics.

Ehrenberg (1980) and Murphy

Topel (1987) both provide estimates of the number of jobs that
in each period.

If we measure time in 2-week intervals,

work suggests that s lies in' the range of .007 to .013.

For

interest rate we set r = .008 which translates into an annual
rate

of

approximately

20%.

Since

our

previous work

suggests that results from this model are not sensitive to changes
in r

over a fairly wide range,

this is the only value for the

interest rate that we consider.
For F and L we begin by noting that our model is homogeneous
of degree zero in F and L so that we may set L = 100 without loss
of generality.

If we then vary F holding all other parameters

fixed we can solve for the equilibrium unemployment and vacancy
rates.

Abraham's

(1983)

work

suggests

that

the

ratio

of

unemployment to vacancies (U/V) varies between 1.5 and 3 over the
business cycle.

Although the actual values of U and V depend on

the other parameters, we find that to obtain such values for U/V in
our model F must lie in range of 95 to 97.5.
The remaining parameters are the wage rate and the search cost
function.

For these values we turn to our previous work, which

makes use of data and results from the Illinois Reemployment Bonus
Experiment (Davidson and Woodbury 1993,

1995).

In the Illinois

Reemployment Bonus Experiment a randomly selected group of new
claimants for UI were offered a $500 bonus for accepting a new job
within

11

duration

weeks
of

of

filing

unemployment

their

for

initial

these
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claim.

bonus-offered

The

average

workers

was

approximately .7 weeks less than the average unemployment duration
of

the

1991) .

randomly selected control group

(Davidson and Woodbury

In our previous work, we estimated the parameters of the

search cost function that would be consistent with such behavioral
results.

That is, we assumed a specific functional form for c(p)

and then solved for the parameters that would make the model's
predictions match the outcome observed in the Illinois experiment.
The functional form that we used was c(p) = cpz, where z denotes the
elasticity of search costs with respect to search effort.

Our

results indicated that for the average bi-weekly wage rate observed
in Illinois ($511), the values of c and z that are consistent with
the Illinois experimental results are c

=

282 and z

=

1.269. 7

In summary, our reference case uses the following parameter
values: s

=

and z

=

.010, r

1.269.

=

.008, L

=

100, F

=

96.25, W

=

511, c

=

282,

Once we have solved for the optimal value for x in

the reference case, we vary sand F over the ranges described above
to test for the sensitivity of our results with respect to each.
Table 1 summarizes the results of solving the model with
infinite potential duration of benefits for the optimal bi-weekly
UI benefit and the optimal replacement rate.

For our reference

case the optimal replacement rate -- the ratio of bi-weekly UI

As we show elsewhere (Davidson and Woodbury 1995), the
Illinois bonus impact suggests that a 10 percentage point increase
in the UI replacement rate lengthens the expected duration of
unemployment by .8 week, and that a 1 week increase in the
potential duration of benefits lengthens the expected duration of
unemployment by .2 week.
These are in the upper-middle .of the
range of existing estimates of the disincentive effects of UI.
7
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benefits to the bi-weekly wage -- is .66. 8

For other values of the

separation rate

jobs

(s)

and total available

(F),

the optimal

replacement rate varies from a low of .60 to a high of .74.

This

range falls between the optimal replacement rate estimates obtained
by

Baily

(around

.50)

and

Flemming

(.75

in

a

model

without

We obtain higher optimal replacement rates when s

is low.

borrowing or lending).

Intuitively, when s is low, separations occur infrequently and the
equilibrium

unemployment

employment,

the government can afford to provide more generous

assistance

to

the

rate

relatively

is

few

relatively

who

are

low.

with

unemployed

generating a large tax burden fqr the employed.

high

without

Also, we obtain

higher optimal replacement rates when Flow.

8
Remarkably, this rate is identical to the rate suggested by
Hamermesh (1977) in his classic study of UI.
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c.

Optimal Replacement Rates with Limited Benefit Duration
We have argued that the optimal Dr, prqgram entails offering

benefits

to

unemployed

indef~nitely.

workers

Moreover,

with

savings ruled out and an elastibityof search with respect to UI
benefits that is

in the upper-middle of the range of existing

estimates,9 we find that the optimaL replacement rate is roughly
This result accords fairly well with some of the

two-thirds.

results reported in Baily (1978) and Flemming (1978).
an

optimal

elasticity

replacement
of

relatively low.

search

rate

effort

of

approx.imCjltffly

with

But his optimal

respe,ct

Baily finds

.50

to

UI

repl~cement rp.t~

when

the

benefits

is

fp.lls below .50

when this elasticity is high, which is the case he considers most
relevant.

In the end, he suggests that replacement rates in the

united states,

which designed to

be

about

.50,

are

too

high.

Flemming finds that the optimal replacement rate is roughly .75
when agents cannot borrow or lend (as in our model).
that when savings are incorporated into the modeL,
replacement rate falls below .50.

Thus"

suggest that the existing UI programs in

But he argues
the optimal

both authors strongly

t~e

united states are too

generous.
As emphasized earlier, both Baily and Flemming assume that the
potential duration of ur ben.efits is

~nfinite.

Although we have

9 Again, Illinois bonus impact, which was used to calibrate
our model, suggests that a 10 percentage point increase in the ur
replacement rate lengthens the expected duration of unemployment by
.8 week, and that a 1 week increase in the potential duration of
benefits lengthens the expected·duration ,o~. unemployment by .2
week.
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Flemming mainly because Baily and Flemming assume that Dr benefits
are provided in perpetuity, whereas we have examined optimal ur
benefits under finite benefit duration.

It is easy to see that the

optimal UI replacement rate could never approach 1 if UI benefits
were offered in perpetuity --

if full

income replacement were

offered indefinitely to unemployed workers, the unemployed would
have no incentive to become reemployed and the economy would shut
down.

On the other hand,

if the government were to offer full

income replacement for only a limited time

(say,

26 weeks), the

unemployed would begin searching around the time their benefits
were exhausted.

The unemployment rate would not explode and the

economy would not shut down.

with full income replacement for 26

weeks, the unemployment rate would increase (to around 10% in our
reference case, compared with 7% with a replacement rate of .5),
but there would be a substantial smoothing of income that would
increase the utility of all risk averse agents.
In summary, the assumption that the potential duration of UI
benefits is unlimited in both the Baily and Flemming models leads
to

a

basic misinterpretation

government

follows

of

the optimal

their

results.

pOlicy of

Only

if

the

offering UI benefits

indefinitely is the optimal replacement rate as low as the values
of .5 and below that Baily and Flemming report.

If the potential

duration of UI benefits is limited, then the optimal replacement
rate is significantly higher.
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1

IV. Extensions
. UI-Ineligibles
Another assumption made by Baily and Flemming is that all
'.
workers are eligible to collect UI benefits. rn reality
this is not the case.
force,

Workers with a weak attachment to the labor

new labor force entrants, and labor force reentrants are

typically not eligible to collect benefits while unemployed..

Blank

and Card (1991) estimate that in the United states no more than 45%
of the unemployed are Ur-eligible.
consideration of UI-ineligibles in the model can change the
optimal replacement rate for two reasons.

First, an increase in

the generosity of the UI system will have a spill-over effect on
the welfare of UI-ineligible workers.

In general, a more generous

ur system reduces the search effort of Ur-eligible jobless workers ..
This reduction in search effort makes it easier for UI-ineligibles
to find jobs and increases their expected lifetime utility.
we

take

this

spill-over

effect

into

account,

the

Once

optimal

replacement rate rises.
Second, when we explicitly account for the fact that not all
workers are UI-eligible, the reemployment probability faced by UIeligible workers changes.

Whether their reemployment prospects are

brightened or dimmed depends on how hard Ur-ineligibles search and
the degree of sUbstitutability in production between UI-eligible
and UI-ineligible workers.

For example, suppose that Ur-eligibles

and UI-ineligibles are considered close substitutes by firms and
that uI-ineligibles search harder than Ur-eligibles
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(since they

receive no ur benefits).

rn this case, adding Ur-ineligibles to

the model will lower the reemployment probabilities faced by U1eligibles and increase the desirable level of insurance (i.e., the
optimal replacement rate will rise) .
On the other hand, suppose that Ur-ineligibles are low-skilled
workers who do not vie for the same jobs as Ur-eligible workers.
In this case, treating all workers as if they are Ur-eligible will
overstate the difficulty that Ur-eligibles will have in finding a
job (since, in reality, there will be fewer workers vying for the
jobs

Ur-eligibles

seek

than

the

model

predicts).

Since

the

presence of ur-ineligibles in the model makes it easier for UIeligibles to find jobs, the level of insurance that the government
needs

to

provide

to

Ur-eligibles

falls

(i.e.,

the

optimal

replacement rate falls).
To investigate the size of these effects we add Ur-ineligibles
to a model in which the potential duration of benefits is unlimited
and

solve

for

the

optimal

replacement

equations of the model as follows:

(1')

L

=

J

+

(3')

F =

J

+ V

(4 ' )

sJq

=

~Ui

U
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rate.

The

fundamental

,)

for j = i, e

v~

(10')

= w(l -

+

r)

[s~

+ (1 -

s)V~]/(l

+ r)

for j = i, e

(11' )

(12')

(13')

Pj

=

sUbscripts
workers.

for j

arg max Vj

e

and

i

Thus, Ue and

= i, e

refer to UI-eligible and UI-ineligible
~

are the numbers of UI-eligible and UI-

ineligible workers seeking jobs in the steady-state equilibrium.
The only new parameter is q (in equations 4' and 5'), which is the
fraction of the unemployed who are UI-ineligible.
As

before,

(1')-(3')

are

simple

accounting

identities.

Equations (4') and (5') are the new steady-state equations -- (4')
equates

the

flows

into

and

out

of

state

Ue

(UI-eligible

unemployment) while (5') equates the flows into and out of state Uj
(UI-ineligible

unemployment).

Equation

(7')

reemployment probabilities for unemployed workers.

defines

the

Equation (10')-

(12') define expected lifetime income for employed and unemployed
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workers.

Note that in each case, a separate definition is provided

for Ur-eligible and Ur-ineligible workers.

Finally, (13') defines

optimal search effort.
The government's problem is the same as before, except that
Social Welfare must now include the expected lifetime income of U1ineligible workers as well.
rt is important to note that in the above model the only
difference between Ur-eligible and Ur-ineligible workers is that
the Ur-eligibles receive benefits while unemployed.

That is, in

this model firms consider the two types of workers good substitutes
in production, and in equilibrium Ur-ineligibles search harder than
Ur-eligibles (since Ur-ineligibles receive no benefits).
An

alternative

to

assuming

that

Ur-eligibles

and

U1-

ineligibles are good substitutes who compete for the same jobs is
to assume that they are poor substitutes.
assigning Ur-ineligibles a

We accomplish this by

low reemployment probability that is

unaffected by the behavior of Ur-eligibles.
(13') for j

Pi

(14)

where

{3

=

i with:

=

{3

takes

probability

to

some

low

value.

UI-ineligibles

That is, we replace

Assigning
captures

a

the

low

reemployment

notion

that

UI-

ineligibles do not compete for the same jobs as Ur-eligibles
that is, they are poor substitutes for Ur-eligibles.
We solve the model under the two alternative assumptions about
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lity between Ur-eligibles and Ur-ineligible and compare
results.

Table 2 shows the optimal replacement rate under

assumptions about turnover (s) and the total number of jobs
lable (F), and assuming that Ur-ineligibles and Ur-eligibles
are close substitutes.

The only new parameter in the model is q,

the proportion of unemployed workers who are Ur-ineligible.
on Blank and Card (1991), we consider q

=

Based

.6 the most likely case,

but report the optimal replacement rate for other values of q for
comparison.
Table 2 shows that accounting for the fact that some workers
are ineligible for ur increases the optimal replacement rate.

rn

our reference case the optimal replacement rate rises from .66 when
there are no Ur-ineligibles to .74 when 60% of the unemployed are
Ur-ineligible.

The optimal replacement rate also increases with q

for the other cases considered in Table 2.
workers are eligible for ur
Flemming did)

Thus, assuming that all

(as we did above and as Baily and

tends to bias downward estimates

of the optimal

replacement rate.
The intuition behind this result was described above.

rf all

workers are assumed to be Ur-eligible, the model cannot take into
account the positive spill-over effect of ur on Ur-ineligibles
(that is, ur benefits improve the well-being of Ur-ineligibles).
Also, the model will overstate the reemployment prospects of UIeligibles unless Ur-eligibles and Ur-ineligibles are very poor
substitutes in production.

Accounting for either of these effects

results in a higher optimal replacement rate.
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Consider now the case in which UI-eligible and UI-ineligible
workers

are not close substitutes.

replacement rate in this case

w~

To

solve

for

the optimal
~,

need to choose a value for

search effort of UI-ineligibles.

As {3 falls,

the

the reemployment

prospects of UI-eligibles brighten and less insurance is needed
~

that is, as

falls, the optimal replacement rate falls.

If {3 is

low enough, adding UI-ineligibles to the model could actually lower
the optimal replacement rate.

That is,

~he

positive effect of a

low {3 on UI-eligible reemployment probabilities could outweigh the
spill-over effect of UI on the well-being of

UI~ineligibles.

The question now is, how Iowa value of {3 would be needed to
leave the optimal replacement rate equal to what it would be in a
model in which all workers are UI-eligible?

For each of the cases

shown in Table 2, we solve the model for the value of

~

that

all of the cases we have checked, the result is that

P

would have

For

to be approximately 15% of the value that it would have been in the
first model -- that is, in order for the optimal replacement rate
to remain constant when UI-ineligibles ,are added to the model, UIineligibles would have to face a reemployment probability .that is
roughly 85% lower than the reemployment probability they face in
the

model

in which

substitutes.

Thus,

UI-eligibles

and

UI-ineliqiblesare

close

the degree of sUbstitutability between UI-

eligibles and UI-ineligibles would have to be extremely low for the
optimal replacement rate to fall when UI-ineligibles are .added to
the model.
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savings
In our model workers are not allowed to save.

0iT

the optimal

replac~ment

This biases our

rate upwards since agents

self-insure against unemployment by saving during periods of
Extending our model

to allow for

savings

is

not

-- we would have to choose a specific form for the
ity functionj
to

obtain

model the capital market,
estimates

of

the

and recalibrate the

search

cost

parameters.

Fortunately, we can say something about the effect of extending our
model

to

include

saving

without

actually

going

through

the

First, it should be clear that our basic result -- that
the optimal potential duration toUI benefits is infinite -- would
continue to hold even in a model where workers could save.

Unless

capital markets were perfect, agents would never save enough while
employed

to

unemployment. 10

fully

smooth

ThUS,

consumption

across

periods

of

the qualitative nature of Figure 1 would

continue to hold with savings in the model -- the vertical axis can
simply be relabeled" '''present consumption."

Extending benefits in

a tax neutral manner will lower present consumption in the "good"
states of unemployment

('when present consumption

high) and increase it in,themost adverse states.

is relatively
It follows that

it will still be optimal to offer UI indefinitely.
Second,sinc'e it is optimal to offer UI benefits indefinitely,
and since Baily and Flemming allowed for savings in their models,
10
As noted in the introduction, the empirical evidence is
clear on this issue -- consumption does fall during periods of
unemployment.
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we can refer to their work to gauge how our results might be
al tered

by

findings.

allowing

workers

to

save.

Consider

first

Baily's

In a two-period model in which agents can save in the

first period of life, he finds that the optimal replacement rate
falls between .33 and .50, depending on the elasticity of search
effort with respect to UI. l1

If the elasticity is low, the optimal

replacement rate is close to .50.

If the elasticity is high, the

optimal replacement rate falls to .33. 12

Our results suggest that

if Baily were to include UI-ineligibles in his model, his optimal
replacement rates would rise by about 8 to 10 percentage points.
Thus, combining our results with Baily's suggests that if workers
can save, the optimal replacement rate will lie somewhere between
.40 and .60.

This rate is optimal, however, only if the potential

duration of UI benefits is infinite.
Consider next Flemming's results.

Flemming develops a model

with infinitely lived agents and allows for varying degrees of
capital market imperfections.

If agents cannot borrow or lend, his

model yields an optimal replacement rate of around .70.

If capital

markets are perfect, the optimal replacement rate lies in the range
of .10 to .20. 13

Our results suggest that adding UI-ineligibles to

11
Baily makes a reasonable assumption about the degree of
risk aversion
specifically, that all agents have the same
constant value of absolute risk aversion, and that this value is
one.

12

13

See his Table 2, column 2, rows 2 and 3.
See his Tables 1 and 3 under the column d· (for the "optimal

dole").
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Flemming's

model

would

boost

these

rates

by

about

8

to

10

percentage points, yielding a range of .25 to .80 for the optimal
replacement rate.

However, we can probably rule out the extreme

values since they are based on extreme assumptions
markets do exist, but they are not perfect.

capital

This leaves us with

optimal replacement rates quite similar to those discussed in the
previous paragraph -- that is, .40 to .60.

Again, it is important

to emphasize that these rates are optimal only if the potential
duration of ur benefits is infinite.
We conclude that if workers are allowed to save during periods
of employment, the optimal replacement rate falls to a level that
is consistent with existing average statutory rates in the United
states.

Hence, the current level of ur benefits would appear to be

about right if the potential duration of benefits were infinite.
But the current potential duration of benefits -- 26 weeks in most
states in nonrecessionary times -- appears to be too short.
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v.

Discussion, Caveats, and Conclusions

Our results suggest that the structure of the existing Dr
system in the United states is sUb-optimal.

Most existing state

systems limit the potential duration of DI benefits to 6 months,
whereas insurance considerations suggest that it would be better to
provide an unlimited potential duration of benefits (see section
III.A).

Also, most states' UI systems pay replacement rates on the

order of .5 to most workers.

But only when the potential duration

of benefits is unlimited are DI replacement rates even as low as
two-thirds optimal {section III. B).

When the potential duration of

benefit is limited to 32 weeks or less,

insurance considerations

suggest that an optimal replacement rate of 1 would be optimal
(section III.C).
A likely objection to the finding that an infinite potential
duration

of

benefits

is

optimal

is

that,

if

benefits

inexhaustible, then workers would never return to work.
that

increasing the potential duratiQn of

benef its

were

It is true
would

lead

workers to remain unemployed longer and would lead to a higher
unemployment rate.

In our model, increasing the potential duration

of UI benefits from 6 months to infinity with a DI replacement rate
of .5 would raise the unemployment rate from 7% to 10% (see section
III.C).

Raising the replacement rate to 1 (from existing levels

around .5) would,similarly,
spells

and

increase

the

increase the length of unemployment
unemployment

rate.

But

unemployment rate is not a shut-down of the economy
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a

higher
workers

not collect UI benefits paying a replacement rate of .5 (or
Moreover,

the increase in the unemployment rate

result from voluntary behavior, not from economic hard times,
would connote an improvement in workers' well-being. w
The model used to derive these conclusions is set· out

in

II, and extends earlier work by Baily (1978) and Flemming
in two ways.

First, whereas Baily and Flemming assumed that

benefits are offered indefinitely, we consider a UI system in
the potential duration of benefits is limited to 26 weeks, as
states.

We find that the optimal

U~

replacement rate

such a system is 1, rather than .75 or less,

as Baily and

suggested (see sections III.C).
we consider how the optimal UI replacement rate is
by the presence of workers who are ineligible for UI
(section IV.A).

This is important because fewer than half of all

unemployed workers in the united states are UI-eligible.
UI-ineligibles to the model has two effects.
positive

spill-over

replacement rate:

effect

that

increases

Adding

The first
the

optimal

is

a
UI

Since UI benefits reduce the search intensity of

UI-eligible workers, UI-ineligibles face less competition for jobs
when

UI

benefits

are

higher.

The

second

concerns

the

SUbstitutability in production between UI-eligible and ineligible
workers.

If UI-eligibles and UI-ineligibles are substitutes, then

the presence of UI-ineligibles makes it harder for UI-eligibles to
14
Increased unemployment, when it is in part increased in
leisure, is hardly a bad thing. This point is made in an unusually
entertaining way by Landsburg (1993).
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find reemployment.

(UI-ineligibles presumably search harder than

UI-ineligibles because they receive no UI benefits.)
presence

of

Ur-ineligibles

leads

to

an

Ignoring the

overstatement

of

the

reemployment prospects for UI-eligible workers, and the optimal UI
replacement rate needs to be increase to compensate.

In general,

then, the presence of UI-ineligibles in the workforce increases the
optimal replacement rate. 15
In section IV.B we consider the effects of adding voluntary
saving to the model.

If workers are able to save, then the optimal

replacement rate falls by about 10 percentage points (for example,
from .6 tp .5).

But allowing workers to save would not alter our

conclusion that an

infinite potential

duration of

benefits

is

optimal.
In the model developed in section II,

we assume that UI-

eligible workers are homogeneous, that the disincentive effects of
UI benefits are in the upper-middle of the range of effects that
have been estimated,
there

any

aversion?]

way

of

and that workers are unable to save.

saying

something

about

the

degree

of

[Is
risk

We have argued that the results are not especially

sensitive to the savings assumption -- in particular, the finding
that the optimal duration of UI benefits is unlimited holds even if

15
We also consider the case in which UI-ineligibles are
lower-skilled workers who are poor substitutes for UI-eligible
'workers.
In this case, the presence of UI-ineligibles in the
workforce lowers the optimal replacement rate (i. e., less insurance
is needed).
Nevertheless, unless the degree of substitutability
between UI-eligibles and Ur-ineligibles is extremely low, the
presence of UI-ineligibles raises the optimal replacement rate on
net.
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are allowed

(section IV.A).

Also,

we believe that the

about the disincentive effects of UI are reasonable and
However, we have not investigated whether results
sensitive to the assumption of worker homogeneity.
Worker heterogeneity could be considered in a number of ways.
approach would be to suppose that some UI-eligible workers face
probability of

layoff with a

low expected duration

of

(blue-collar production workers), while others might
a longer expected duration of
(white-collar

non-production

workers).

Another

might be to suppose that some UI-eligible workers are
attached to the labor force (as most appear to be), but
a significant minority are weakly attached to the labor force.
an unlimited potential duration of benefits would remain
in a model that accounts for one or both of these types of
is an open question.

41

BB-44

References
Abraham, Katherine G. "structural/Frictional vs. Deficient Demand
Unemployment: Some New Evidence." American Economic Review 73
(September 1983): 708-724.
Baily, Martin N. "Some Aspects of Optimal Unemployment Insurance."
Journal of Public Economics 10 (1978): 379-402.
Blank, Rebecca M. and David E. Card. "Recent Trends in Insured and
Uninsured Unemployment: Is there an Explanation?" Quarterly
Journal of Economics 106 (November 1991): 1157-1189.
Davidson, Carl and Stephen A. Woodbury. "Effects of a Reemployment
Bonus under Differing Benefit Entitlements, or, Why the
Illinois Experiment Worked."
Manuscript, Department of
Economics,
Michigan state University,
and W.E.
Upjohn
Institute for Employment Research, March 1991.
Davidson, Carl and Stephen A.Woodbury. "The Displacement Effect of
Reemployment Bonus Programs." Journal of Labor Economics 11
(October 1993): 575-605.
Davidson, Carl and Stephen A. Woodbury. "Further Lessons from the
Reemployment Bonus Experiments." Manuscript, Department of
Economics,
Michigan State University,
and W.E.
Upjohn
Institute for Employment Research, December 1994.
Davidson, Carl and Stephen A. Woodbury. "Unemployment Insurance and
Unemployment:
Implications
of
the
Reemployment
Bonus
Experiments." Manuscript, Department of Economics, Michigan
State University, and W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment
Research, February 1995.
Ehrenberg, Ronald G. "The Demographic structure of Unemployment
Rates and Labor Market Transition Probabilities." Research in
Labor Economics 3 (1980): 214-291.
Flemming, J. S. "Aspects of Optimal Unemployment
Journal of Public Economics 10 (1978): 403-425.

Insurance."

Gruber, Jonathan S.
'!The Consumption Smoothing Benefits of
Unemployment Insurance." Manuscript, Department of Economics,
MIT, May 1994.
Hamermesh, Daniel S. Jobless Pay and the Economy. Baltimore, MD:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977.
Landsburg, Steven E. "How statistics Lie: Unemployment Can Be Good
for You." In The Armchair Economist: Economics and Everyday
Life. New York: The Free Press, 1993. Pp. 127-137.
42

BB-45

y, Kevin M.
and Robert H~ Topel.
"The Evolution of
Unemployment in the United states: 1968-1985." in NBER
Macroeconomics Annual 1987, edited by stanley Fischer.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 11-58.

ry, Christopher J. "The Adequacy of Unemployment Insurance
Benefits." Manuscript, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment
Research, August 1994.
nization for Economic cooperation and Development (OECD).
"Unemployment Benefit Rules and Labour Market Policy." OECD
Employment Outlook (July 1991): 199-236.

43

BB-46

Figure 1
The Optimal Potential Duration of UI Benefits Is Unlimited
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Table 1
Optimal Unemployment Insurance Benefits and Replacement Rates
under Various Assumptions,
Model with Infinite Potential Duration of UI Benefits

Assumptions

Optimal bi-weekly UI benefit

Optimal replace ment rate

(x)

(x/w)

Reference case
(s = .010, F = 96.25)

335

.66

Low turnover
(s = .007, F = 96.25)

380

.74

High turnover
(s = .013, F = 96.25)

305

.60

Fewer total jobs available
(s=.010, F=95)

356

.70

More total jobs available
(s=.010, F=97.5)

317

.62

Note: Parameter values in the reference case are as follows: separation rate (s )=.010;
total jobs available (F) = 96.25; labor force (L) = 100; bi-weekly interest rate = .008;
bi-weekly reemployment wage = $500; search cost parameter (c) = 282;z = 1.269.

g:\pool\aaw\impacu\papcr3\tablc1.d94
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Table 2
Optimal UI Replacement Rates When Some Workers
Are Ineligible for UI, Various Assumptions,
Model with Infinite Potential Duration of UI Benefits
Proportion of unemployed workers ineligible for UI (q)
0

.15

.30

.45

.60

Reference case
(s = .010, F = 96.25)

.66

.67

.69

.72

.74

Low turnover
(s = .007, F = 96.25)

.74

.75

.77

.79

.81

High turnover
(s = .013, F = 96.25)

.60

.62

.64

.67

.70

Fewer total jobs available
(s=.010, F=95)

.70

.71

.73

.75

.77

More total jobs available
(s='.010, F=97.5)

.62

.64

.66

.69

.72

Notes:

See Table 1. The results shown are from a model in which UI-eligibles and
UI-ineligibles are good substitutes. Optimal replacement rates can fall below those
shown in the table if UI-eligibles and UI-ineligibles are sufficiently poor substitutes.
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